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Abstract
Although there are numerous studies of the dowry phenomenon in India, research pertaining
to the custom in the rest of South Asia is sparse. The aim of this paper is to study dowry
payments in Pakistan. Several interpretations for dowry are distinguished using a simple theo-
retical framework and the predictions of this model are tested using recent data from Pakistan.
The investigation concludes that despite religious and cultural di®erences, the phenomenon of
dowry in Pakistan appears to occur for reasons which are similar to those in India. That is, in
rural areas it seems to be the more traditional pre-mortem inheritance, whereas in urban areas
the payment has transformed into a groomprice.
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acknowledged.1. Introduction
There exists a large body of research aimed at explaining the dowry phenomenon in India1. In
contrast, to my knowledge, there has been no research on dowry payments in Pakistan and the
aim of this paper is to investigate these payments.2 An exploration of how dowry payments have
evolved through time is not feasible due to limitations of the data; instead I focus on their current
role in Pakistan.
The paper develops and empirically distinguishes between three di®erent theories of dowry.
The various explanations for dowry are synthesized into the following categories: (1) a transfer of
wealth to the groom's household to pay for a high quality groom; (2) a compensation payment to
the groom's household for receiving a bride who is an economic liability; and (3) a pre-mortem
inheritance given to the bride. We do not know from the data, which simply reports the amount of
dowry, which motive parents had for transferring the payment nor whose hands the payment fell
into. These are the questions which are asked in this paper. By the use of a simple model, which
integrates the three roles for dowry, we are able to empirically distinguish between the di®erent
roles of dowry and hence uncover which of these motives is, in fact, the cause of dowry payments
in modern-day Pakistan.
The following section brie°y outlines the predominant explanations for the existence of dowries.
In Section 3, a simple matching model of marriage to illustrate the various roles of dowry payments
is provided. The data used in this study are described in Section 4. The method of estimation is
given in Section 5 after which the estimation results are discussed. Section 7 concludes.
2. Motivation for Dowry
A woman in Pakistan is entitled by law at marriage to: (i) a dowry and marriage gifts from her
parents; and (ii) a dower (mahr), a bridal gift from the groom which is generally intended to
provide some insurance for her in the case of divorce (see Patel 1979, Korson and Sabzwari 1984,
and Afzal et. al. 1973). Further, Pakistani women have the right to inheritance and ownership
1For examples in the economic literature, see Rao (1993a and 1993b), Deolalikar and Rao (1990), and Edlund
(1996). Within the sociological and anthropological literature, see, for example, Paul (1986), Caplan (1984), Billig
(1992), Chauhan (1995), Caldwell et. al. (1983), Srinivas (1984), Upadhya (1990), and Epstein (1973).
2In general, research directly pertaining to the custom of dowry in the rest of South Asia is relatively sparse. A
notable exception is the study by Lindenbaum (1981) which investigates the transition from bride-price to dowry of
a predominantly Muslim community in rural Bangladesh.
2of property. According to Muslim Personal Law (Shariat), daughters are entitled to a half of the
share which a son inherits from his father. It is noted, however, that the dowry she receives at the
time of marriage is usually considered her pre-mortem inheritance, which is typically less than she
is entitled to under the law (see Donnan 1988 and Patel 1979).
A natural question to ask in the exploration of Pakistani dowries is how this custom di®ers
from those in India where the severe social consequences of rising dowries have motivated a large
body of research aimed at explaining the phenomenon.3 Importantly, modern-day dowry payments
in India are distinct from the traditional custom of bride-wealth (stridhan) which is a parental gift
to the bride (see for example, Paul 1986). Traditionally, the groom could share this gift during
the marriage, but ultimately the wife had property rights over it. The modern dowry payment,
on the other hand, consists of wealth transferred to the groom and his parents from the bride's
parents, with the bride having no ownership rights over the payment. This modern arrangement is
referred to as `groom-price' and its amount increases dramatically in accordance with the `desirable'
qualities of the groom.4
Reports of both increasing dowries (see Sathar and Kazi 1988) and dowers (see Korson and
Sabzwari 1984 and Afzal et. al. 1973) in Pakistan do suggest that, as in India, marriage payments
have been in°ating.5 However, the role of dowry payments in Pakistan has not been studied. In
particular, it is unclear whether dowry in Pakistan has prevailed as a transfer to the bride which
remains her property throughout the marriage (and thus functions as a pre-mortem inheritance),
or whether, as in India, the custom has transformed into a groom-price.
More generally, the convention of dowry typically appears in complex societies with substan-
tial socio-economic di®erentiation, and class strati¯cation.6 Moreover their marriage practices are
typically monogamous, patrilineal, and endogamous, i.e., men and women of equal status marry
3The total cash and goods involved are so large that the dowry payment can lead to impoverishment of the bridal
family. This has a devastating e®ect on the lives of unmarried women who are increasingly considered stringent
economic liabilities. For example, the custom of dowry is often linked to the practice of female infanticide. Other
repercussions include extreme abuse of women as exempli¯ed by terms like \bride-burning" and \dowry-death"
becoming commonly used. The links to dowry in°ation have been drawn by sociologists; for example, Kumari (1989),
Chauhan (1995), McCoid (1989), Pawar (1990), Lata (1990), and Pathak (1990) address these issues.
4See, for example, Upadhya (1990), Caplan (1984), Billig (1992), Srinivas (1984), and Bradford (1985) for a
discussion of the occurrence of a groom-price in India. See Caldwell et. al. (1983), Rao and Rao (1980), Billig (1992),
Caplan (1986), and Hooja (1969) for evidence that the size of the dowry payment correpsond with qualities of the
groom.
5In e®orts to reduce excessive expenditures for weddings, the Dowry and Bridal Gifts Act of 1976 was imposed
by the Pakistani parliament. This law placed limits on the value of dowry and dower.
6See, for example, Jackson and Romney (1973), Harrell and Dickey (1985), and Gaulin and Boster (1990).
3(Gaulin and Boster 1990). As a result, dowry has often been considered a payment for closer
political, economic, class, or ethnic alliances valuable to the bride's family in order to preserve
the status of the family into subsequent generations (see, for example, Hoch 1989).7 Gaulin and
Boster (1990) have suggested that monogamous societies with signi¯cant and large di®erences in
wealth among men, dowry is simply a means of female competition for desirable, wealthy husbands.
Both of these interpretations of dowry, for the purposes here, fall into the ¯rst category of dowry
listed in the introduction, termed groom-price. As already mentioned, this role for dowry has been
emphasized in the recent literature of modern-day dowry payments in India. Others have observed
that in societies where dowry has occurred, women were considered an economic burden since a
wife performed little or no income-producing work for the household. The second interpretation of
dowry therefore links the payments to the productivity of women and treats bride-price and dowry
payments as opposites. In societies where women are economically productive, a bride-price pay-
ment is made to their families to compensate for the loss of a worker. If women do not contribute
to household income, dowry is paid to the groom's family as a compensation for an unproductive
member.8 However, the most common form of dowry is a pre-mortem female inheritance where
women retain ownership of her gift during marriage, and can reclaim it for her own welfare if the
marriage is dissolved (see, for example, Goody 1976 and Hughes 1985). This third de¯nition of
dowry is therefore associated with societies in which inheritance °owed to both sons and daugh-
ters. In several countries, dowry as a pre-mortem inheritance given to women was written into the
constitution, as was traditionally the case in Pakistan. The aim of the next section is to develop a
model which embeds and distinguishes these three potential roles for dowry payments in a matching
model of marriage.
7The interpretation of dowry as a medium of acquiring status is a widespread view, see, for example, Tambiah
(1973) and Comaro® (1980). Dowry payments are often thought to facilitate hypergamy; that is, when families of
lower social status marry their daughter into a family of superior status.
8Boserup (1970) was the foremost to link the brideprice and dowry clearly. She distinguished between the two
types of society on the basis of agricultural techniques. Societies marked by shifting cultivation are characterised by
widespread participation of women in agricultural labour, therefore women are more valued and hence bride-price is
practised. In societies marked by plough cultivation, women do less work than men, the status of women is lower
and hence dowry is practiced.
43. Model
For the purposes here, I will only focus on dowry payments at the time of marriage. Therefore,
bequests, to either sons or daughters, after marriage are not considered and neither are marriage
transfers in the opposite direction, i.e., from the groom's side. The data do not include such
information and the theoretical distinction between dowries and bequests has been analysed by
Botticini and Siouw (2000). The most important distinction between the di®erent roles of dowry
described above is the (often unwritten) ownership right of the payment. The notion of paying
for a groom is very distinct from giving to the bride. To this end, I assume that total amount of
resources devoted to a daughter's marriage, denoted by Z, is divided into two potential components:
the portion paid directly to the daughter (inheritance) and the portion paid directly to the groom's
family, represented by d.
Since Pakistani marriages are typically arranged by the families of the groom and bride, assume
that the utilities of the bride and her family are grouped together and similarly for the groom. The
utility that a bride and her family receive from her marriage is represented by:
U = u(Z ¡d) + °(yb + yg) (3.1)
where u(¢) is concave and 0 ￿ ° ￿ 1. The direct net bene¯t of marriage is that a woman consumes a
proportion ° of total couple income, yb+yg. Individual incomes yb(eb) and yg(eg) are non-decreasing
in their arguments, the education (or human capital) levels of the bride and groom respectively.
Note that assuming linearity in the direct contribution to marriage instead of concavity does not
alter the results. The budget constraint of the bridal family is:
YB ¸ Z + peb (3.2)
where YB is the total amount of household income allocated to a given daughter, and peb are the
resources allocated to the investment in her human capital. YB is an exogenous variable.
The utility that a groom and his family receive from the marriage is given by:
V = v(YG + d) + (1 ¡°)(yb + yg) (3.3)
where v(¢) is concave and YG is the groom's family household income after investing in the groom's
human capital, eg. This household income enters directly into the utility because in patrilocal
5societies such as Pakistan, upon marriage the bride leaves her household to join that of her groom.
Therefore, unlike the bride and her family, the groom and his parents pool resources after marriage.
For simplicity, it is assumed that the bride does not directly share in these pooled resources, rather
her direct bene¯t from the marriage is only through her husband's income. This assumption is
made to distinguish between a dowry payment made to the groom and his family and a transfer
made directly to the bride. If instead, the bride directly bene¯ted from the income of the groom's
family, YG, none of the results would be signi¯cantly altered.
The utility of the bridal family if their daughter does not marry is represented by:
U = u(YB ¡ peb) + yb (3.4)
and for the groom's side it is:
V = v(YG) +yg (3.5)
Brides and grooms prefer to marry than remain single if the following participation constraints
are satis¯ed:
U ¸ U (3.6)
V ¸ V (3.7)
Assume that brides and grooms are respectively ranked in order of their economic value, that is,
yb1 ￿ yb2 ￿ ¢¢¢ ￿ ybn and yg1 ￿ yg2 ￿ ¢¢¢ ￿ ygn. Denote the dowry payment a bride ranked j o®ers
a groom ranked i by di;j. In equilibrium a bride of rank j marries groom ranked i if and only if
she does not prefer to be matched with any other groom, i.e., the following incentive compatibility
constraint holds:
u(Zj ¡ di;j) + °(ybj + ygi) ¸ u(Zj ¡ dk;j) + °(ybj + ygk) (3.8)
for all i 6= k. Similarly a groom of rank i marries bride of rank j if and only if:
v(YGi + di;j) + (1 ¡ °)(ybj + ygi) ¸ v(YGi + di;k) + (1 ¡ °)(ybk + ygi) (3.9)
for all j 6= k.
63.1. Equilibrium Dowry Payments
Since brides' utility falls with dowry, brides' participation constraint restricts the maximum level
of dowry. Substituting (3.2) into (3.1), this constraint implies:
u(YB ¡ peb ¡ d) + °(yb + yg) ¸ u(YB ¡ peb) + yb (3.10)
Conversely, the grooms' participation constraint restricts the minimum level of dowry that brides
can o®er:
v(YG + d) + (1 ¡ °)(yb + yg) ¸ v(YG) + yg (3.11)
Brides must therefore o®er a dowry payment which at least satis¯es:
d ¸ h(°yg ¡ (1 ¡ °)ybjYG) (3.12)
where h0(¢) > 0. The above implies that dowry payments are positive if a bride consumes (°yg)
more than she contributes ((1¡°)yb) to a marriage. We assume that brides can a®ord this payment
so that bride participation constraints are satis¯ed.9 Holding all else constant, for a higher YG,
(3.11) is satis¯ed for a higher d, due to concavity.
Marriages are monogamous; one bride matches with one groom.10 Dowry payments in the
marriage market adjust to satisfy equilibrium conditions such that grooms and brides who are
matched do not prefer to be married to anyone else, i.e., incentive compatibility constraints (3.8)
and (3.9) must hold. When some potential spouses are preferred, and brides and grooms respectively
have identical preferences over potential spouses, the only stable equilibrium is positive assortative
matching, i.e., brides and grooms of similar rank marry.11 This is because higher ranked brides
and grooms will always be able to outbid those of a lower rank since they have wealthier fathers.12
In equilibrium, same ranked grooms and brides will marry and equilibrium dowry payments
are such that brides of rank i o®er to their spouses just enough to outbid lower ranked brides.
Taking as given their equilibrium dowry payment, di¡1;i¡1, the highest payment a lower ranked
bride will o®er a groom of rank i makes her indi®erent between a groom of her own rank and one
9This assumption is in accordance with the fact that almost all women marry in Pakistan.
10There is no polygamy in the data.
11This is a well known result in the two-sided matching literature; see, for example, Becker (1991) and Lam (1988)
for the case of transferable utility and Gale and Shapley (1962) for the case of non-transferable utility.
12Concavity in the utility function is also needed for this result.
7ranked above. Therefore the following incentive compatibility condition holds in equilibrium for
i ¡1 brides:
Ui¡1(ygi¡1) = Ui¡1(ygi) (3.13)
where Uj(ygi) is the utility of a bride ranked j from marrying a groom ranked i. This condition
can be represented, without loss of generality, by:
di;i¡1 ¡di¡1;i¡1 = f(°(ygi ¡ ygi¡1)jYBi¡1) (3.14)
where f0(¢) > 0. Given concavity, this di®erence in dowry payments, di;i¡1 ¡di¡1;i¡1, is increasing
in YBi¡1.
To support an assortative matching equilibrium, grooms will not accept an o®er from lower
ranked brides if the following incentive compatibility constraint holds:
V i(ybi) ¸ V i(ybi¡1) (3.15)
where V i(ybj) is the utility of a groom ranked i marrying a bride ranked j. This condition can be
represented, without loss of generality, by:
di;i ¡ di;i¡1 ¸ k((1 ¡ °)(ybi ¡ ybi¡1)jYGi) (3.16)
where k0(¢) > 0. Given concavity, this di®erence in dowry payments di;i ¡ di;i¡1 is increasing in
YGi.
In equilibrium, brides of rank i o®er a dowry payment, di;i, such that (3.15) holds with equality
and (3.13) is satis¯ed. Using (3.14) and (3.16) equilibrium dowry payments satisfy:
di;i ¡ di¡1;i¡1 = f(°(ygi ¡ ygi¡1)jYBi¡1) ¡ k((1 ¡ °)(ybi ¡ ybi¡1)jYGi) (3.17)
This di®erence in dowry payments is greater the larger is the marginal bene¯t to brides marrying
relative to grooms, i.e., °(ygi ¡ygi¡1_ ) > (1¡°)(ybi ¡ybi¡1), and also the more di®erentiated grooms
are relative to brides, i.e., (ygi ¡ ygi¡1_ ) > (ybi ¡ ybi¡1). Both of these implications are very likely
in a patriarchal society such as Pakistan where the employment of women is frowned upon and
hence women are not only entirely dependent on men, but also are relatively homogeneous in terms
of quality compared to men. Additionally this di®erence in dowry payments, di;i ¡ di¡1;i¡1, is
increasing in both YBi¡1 and YGi.
8In equilibrium, higher ranked grooms receive higher dowry payments because of their greater
marketable traits. Because the lowest ranked grooms are of the least desirable quality, this lowest
payment need only satisfy participation constraints, i.e. condition (3.12). Therefore,
d1;1 = h(°yg1 ¡ (1 ¡ °)yb1jYG1) (3.18)
and (3.17) holds for all grooms ranked i, for 2 ￿ i ￿ n. Because dowry payment to all higher ranked
grooms are larger than d1;1, participation constraints are necessarily satis¯ed for all grooms. Given
that brides are paying just enough to outbid the brides ranked just below, i.e., those poorer, they
can always a®ord this payment and hence the participation constraint for a given bride is always
satis¯ed, i.e., the upper bound on dowry payments is not reached.
4. Roles of Dowry
The above model encompasses the three roles of dowry. Condition (3.12) re°ects the compensation
component where the dowry payment is positive if a bride consumes more than she contributes
to a marriage. Condition (3.17) re°ects the groom-price component, where dowries are higher the
greater the competition amongst brides for desirable grooms. Finally, Z ¡ d is the inheritance
component, which is the amount of wealth which falls directly into the hands of the bride.
If we assume that it is always worthwhile for a bride to marry than remain unmarried then
the bridal family always o®ers the payment, d, to satisfy incentive conditions, however, they never
o®er more than is required. The inheritance payment is equal to the residual income allocated to a
daughter's marriage after paying for her groom the amount d for a given level of her human capital,
eb (and hence her income yb), and the quality of her groom, yg. In other words, this amount is
positive, if the marginal return to paying more for a groom is zero.
Using conditions (3.17) and (3.18), and substituting backwards, the payment to the groom and
his family, d, can be represented by:




f(°(ygk+1 ¡ ygk)jYBk) ¡ k((1 ¡ °)(ybk+1 ¡ ybk)jYGk+1) (4.2)
where (4.1) is the compensation payment part of dowry and (4.2) is the groomprice component.
9The inheritance component of dowry, denoted Di, can be expressed as:
Di = Zi ¡ di;i = YBi ¡pebi ¡ di;i (4.3)
In the data, we have information on both the incidence of dowries and the value of these
payments. We can use the above model to generate testable implications for both of these variables.
We only observe the probability that a dowry was paid and the total transfer of dowry, both of
which likely embed all three roles for dowry, as is the case in the above model. However, the model
allows us to uncover which is the prominent reason for transferring a dowry, by generating distinct
predictions for each role of dowry. We ¯rst turn to the predictions for the incidence of the dowry
phenomenon.
4.1. Prominence of the di®erent roles of dowry
The model predicts that which of these roles is prominent depends on the wealth distribution of
bride and groom families, and the relative groom and bride heterogeneity. To analyse these di®erent
situations, consider three cases. We can think of them as three di®erent stages of development. In
the early stages (or pre-development stage), all individuals are poor and in turn grooms and brides
are homogeneous in terms of economic value. In a later stage some individuals become richer.
Depending on the relative returns to male and female human capital, either richer parents invest
more in both their daughters and sons or only in their sons. In the former case, both potential
brides and grooms become increasingly heterogeneous in terms of economic value, or in the latter
case, only grooms become more heterogeneous as members of society become wealthier when the
returns to female human capital are very low. The implications for dowry payments in these three
stages of development are characterised as follows.
Case 1: Brides and Grooms are Homogeneous
Suppose all brides and grooms are homogenous, i.e., ybi = ybj and ygi = ygj for all i 6= j. In
this case:
d = h(°yg ¡ (1 ¡ °)ybjYG) (4.4)
D = YB ¡ peb ¡ h(°yg ¡ (1 ¡ °)ybjYG) (4.5)
Brides pay only what they require for a groom, i.e., payment d satis¯es participation constraint for
grooms. The remaining income available for a bride (YB ¡ peb ¡d) is given as inheritance. In this
10case, we can observe a compensation payment, d, and an inheritance, D, but we do not observe a
groomprice. Note that if brides and grooms are of equal worth in a marriage, i.e., °yg = (1¡°)yb,
then only an inheritance payment is observed.
Case 2: Brides are Homogeneous and Grooms are Heterogeneous
In this case, there is no ranking of brides, all brides are identical. The payments each groom,
ranked i, denoted, di, receives is:
d1 = h(°yg1 ¡ (1 ¡ °)ybjYG1) (4.6)
and
di = h(°yg1 ¡ (1 ¡ °)ybjYG1) +
i¡1 X
k=1
f(°(ygk+1 ¡ ygk)jYBk) (4.7)
for 1 < i ￿ n: The inheritance given directly to brides, for 1 ￿ i ￿ n; is equal to:
Di = YB ¡ peb ¡ di (4.8)
Brides either match with a lower quality groom, make a lower payment to grooms and receive a
higher inheritance, or they match with a higher quality groom, make a higher payment to the groom
and his family and receive a lower inheritance. Since all brides are identical, they must have identical
utility levels in equilibrium. For the lowest type groom, we can observe a compensation payment
(if °yg > (1¡°)yb), for all the higher ranked grooms we observe a groomprice component. For the
brides matching with the lower type grooms, we could also observe an inheritance payment, but for
those matching with the higher type grooms, we will not. This follows because same quality brides
are competing amongst themselves for di®erent quality grooms, the highest price (to the highest
quality groom) will be bid up to the point where brides are indi®erent and may well exhaust their
income constraint.
Case 3: Brides and Grooms are Heterogeneous
In this case, there is also a ranking of brides and assortative matching implies that same ranked
brides and grooms match. Equilibrium dowry payments are represented by the following:
d1;1 = h(°yg1 ¡ (1 ¡ °)yb1jYG1) (4.9)
11and




f(°(ygk+1 ¡ ygk)jYBk) ¡ k((1 ¡ °)(ybk+1 ¡ ybk)jYGk+1) (4.10)
for 1 < i ￿ n: Inheritance transfers, for 1 ￿ i ￿ n, are:
Di;i = YBi ¡pebi ¡ di;i (4.11)
This case is similar to the prior case except that payments to the grooms are lower in the sense
that relative bride quality can substitute for part of the transfer to grooms. Additionally, in this
case, the inheritance component of dowry will also be observed even for the higher quality matches.
This follows because, higher quality brides need only outbid lower quality brides for their desired
groom. As lower quality brides are poorer, the payment that is required does not exhaust the
income available to the higher quality brides and hence there are leftover funds available to transfer
to their daughter directly. Therefore there is always an inheritance component to dowry, since
brides are paying less than what they can a®ord to outbid the lower types. This is the central
di®erence between Cases 2 and 3.
Using these three cases, we can characterise testable predictions with regards to the prominence
of one role of dowry relative to another.
Conjecture 1. Dowry as a compensation payment is more prominent when both brides and
grooms are homogeneous and when there is inequality between the economic value of the bride
and groom of a given couple. This will occur when the relative returns to female human capital are
relatively low and when average wealth is low, with most families at the low end of the distribution.
Conjecture 2. Dowry as an inheritance is more prominent the more equality there is between
brides and grooms, both when there is heterogeneity amongst brides and grooms and when there is
not, i.e., when relative groom and bride heterogeneity is small. It is more prominent when average
wealth is high and when the returns to female human capital are relatively high.
Conjecture 3. Dowry as a groomprice is more prominent when there is greater heterogeneity
amongst grooms relative to brides, and the more unequal brides and grooms are in terms of relative
12economic value. It is more prominent when average wealth is high and when the relative returns
to female human capital are low.
4.2. Predictions for the value of dowry
The three cases outlined above highlight some conditions under which each of the roles of dowry
are prominent. They provide testable predictions on the occurrence of dowry. We now turn to the
comparative statics of the model to derive testable implications on the value of dowry. To do this,
we use the expressions from the most general case of the model, Case 3, where we allow for income
heterogeneity amongst brides and grooms. From expression (4.9), we see that the compensation
payment, d, is increasing in yg1 and decreasing in yb1 (and hence eb1) and YG1, i.e., d is changing
with the characteristics of the lowest quality match. Substituting (4.9) and (4.10), into (4.11), we
see that the inheritance payment, Di;i, is increasing in YBi and YG1 and decreasing in YBj, for
1 ￿ j ￿ i¡1, and YGj, for 2 ￿ j ￿ i. The payment is also decreasing in all ygj, for 1 ￿ j ￿ i. The
inheritance payment is increasing in eb if (1 ¡ °)y0
b(eb) > p, otherwise it is non-increasing. When
grooms become more heterogeneous than brides, a groomprice (expression (4.10)) is observed and
this payment, di;i, is increasing in the relative quality of grooms and decreasing in the relative
quality of brides, represented by ygk+1 ¡ ygk and ybk+1 ¡ ybk respectively for 1 ￿ k < i. The
payment is also increasing the more heterogeneous are grooms relative to brides, i.e., the larger is
(ygk+1 ¡ygk)¡(ybk+1 ¡ybk) where 1 ￿ k < i. The groomprice, di;i, is increasing in both the income
of poorer bridal families, i.e., YBj where 1 ￿ j ￿ i¡1, and in the wealth of all groom families YGj,
for 1 ￿ j ￿ i. We now have the following predictions.
Conjecture 4. Dowry as a compensation payment increases with groom quality relative to bride
quality of the couple. It increases with groom family income and is una®ected by bridal family
income.
Conjecture 5. Dowry as an inheritance transfer increases with bride family income and decreases
with that of the groom. The transfer decreases with the quality of grooms, and increases in brides'
economic value. It increases in bride's eduction if the marginal returns to brides education on the
marriage market are higher then the marginal cost.
Conjecture 6. Dowry as a groomprice increases with grooms' relative quality and decreases with
13brides' relative quality. It is higher the more heterogeneous grooms are relative to brides. The
payment increases with groom family income and is una®ected by that of the bride. It does,
however, increase with both average bride and groom family wealth in the marriage market.13
5. Estimation
The theoretical analysis provides testable implications for both the prominence of dowry (Conjec-
tures 1 to 3) and the value of dowry (Conjectures 4 to 6) for each role of dowry. I therefore examine
the various models of dowry by estimating two main equations: the probability that a dowry is
paid, and the value of dowry. The probability that a dowry is paid is represented by the following:
P = ¯PXP + "P (5.1)
where P is equal to one if a dowry is paid and equal to zero otherwise. The vector XP contains
the determinants of the occurrence of dowry discussed in Conjectures 1 to 3, that is, measures of
groom and bride heterogeneity, the relative returns to female and male human capital, and average
household income.14 In addition to these, variables are included to proxy for customs and traditions
which may or may not allow for dowry to be transferred. The vector also contains a variable which
represents the demographic environment, generally known as the marriage squeeze ratio, which is
equal to the relative supply of potential brides and grooms since population growth is believed to
lead to the existence of the dowry custom.15
The value of dowry, denoted D, is represented by the following equation:
D = ¯DXD + "D (5.2)
The vector XD contains predominantly individual and family characteristics which pertain to the
determinants of the value of dowry summarized in Conjectures 4 to 6. For a given match i these
13In the model it is assumed that brides and grooms do not directly bene¯t from the parental wealth of their
respective spouses. If instead, grooms and brides, and their families, directly bene¯ted from the wealth status of
their in-laws, then the predictions for the wealth of the groom's family would not be altered, but those for the bride's
family would. In particular, dowry as a compensation and groomprice payment would decrease with bridal family
wealth. It will be seen that this relationship is not found in the data.
14Dowry payments are typically associated with economic development, see, for example, Jackson and Romney
(1973), Harrell and Dickey (1985), and Gaulin and Boster (1990). Chauhan (1995), Paul (1986), Srinivas (1984),
Epstein (1973), Billig (1992), and Upadhya (1990) link the dowry phenomenon in South Asia with modernsiation.
15That dowry is the response to demographic change where men marry younger women, resulting in an excess
supply of brides, has long been suggested (Hughes 1985). Rao (1993a and 1993b) and Caldwell et. al. (1983), for
example, cite population growth as the primary reason for dowry payments in South Asia.
14include: groom and bride quality, ygi and ybi; groom relative to bride quality (ygi ¡ ybi); groom
quality relative to other grooms (ygi ¡ yg), where yg re°ects the average quality of grooms; bride
quality relative to other brides, (ybi ¡yb), where yb re°ects the average quality of grooms; bride and
groom family wealth, YBi and YGi; bride's education, ebi; and the average parent income, Y . In
addition, a measure of groom and bride relative heterogeneity is included (as Conjecture 6 suggests).
A compensation payment is increasing in (ygi ¡ybi) and YGi and una®ected by all other variables.
A groomprice payment is increasing in (ygi ¡ yg), YGi, and Y , decreasing in (ybi ¡ yb), una®ected
by YBi, and increasing in groom relative to bride heterogeneity. An inheritance is increasing in YBi
and ebi (potentially) and has the opposite relationship (relative to a groomprice payment) with all
other variables. Note that in the model yg and yb broadly represent the total value that a groom
and bride respectively bring to a marriage. In the estimations, variables, in addition to actual
earnings, will enter to proxy for this contribution to marriage like education and household labour
input.
Alternative to the above, it could be assumed that XP = XD and the two equations (5.1)
and (5.2) would be estimated as one equation. In such a tobit estimation, it would be implicit
that a zero dowry payment is equivalent to no dowry transferred. This procedure seems somewhat
restrictive given that the absence of the dowry custom can be a separate phenomenon from merely
paying a very low dowry. In other words, there likely exists a type of switching mechanism from
the custom of no dowry to paying dowry. To address this issue, the estimations of the event that
a dowry is paid and the value of dowry are analysed independently.
5.1. Sample Selection
Before estimating equations (5.1) and (5.2), there are sample selection issues to address. In partic-
ular, there are two selection processes which a®ect the sample of women who paid a dowry: ¯rst,
not all women eligible for the dowry question responded, and second, some who did respond did
not pay a dowry. The latter selection rule is represented by equation (5.1) and the former is as
follows:
R = ¯RXR + "R (5.3)
15where R is an index function such that R > 0 if an eligible women did respond to the dowry
question and R ￿ 0 otherwise. It is most plausible that women did not respond to the dowry
question principally because of confusion with respect to the eligibility criteria. Women were asked
to respond to the dowry question, only if they had married within the past ¯ve years. As a result,
it is likely that women who married recently answered the question but those who married earlier,
but were eligible, did not. In essence, the selection process excludes some women who married
earlier.
Since the aim of the paper is to investigate the role of dowry payments in present-day Pakistan,
that some women who married earlier were omitted from the sample should not bias the estimates.
It may be the case, however, that women did not respond to the dowry question because their
parents did not give a dowry. This is perhaps suggested by the fact that ethnic variation is a
determinant of brides' response rate, where the incidence of dowry is plausibly a function of social
norms which vary across ethnic groups, but confusion with regard to the eligibility criteria is less
likely to vary by groups and more likely to be individual speci¯c. In this scenario the two selection
processes are not independent. To this end, the inverse Mills' ratio from a regression of the response
rate, equation (5.3), is computed and enters into the estimation of the probability of paying a dowry,
equation (5.1). The year each female married is used to identify the selection rule into the dowry
sample, i.e., the probability that an eligible woman answered the dowry question. It is possible
that the custom of dowry has changed through time, and that a retrospective survey on dowry
could capture some of these e®ects. However, because the time period is so short, i.e., ¯ve years,
it is unlikely that changes in the custom of dowry would be re°ected during those ¯ve years and
thus signi¯cantly a®ect the estimations of (5.1) and (5.2).
The estimation of the value of dowry will account for both of the above sampling issues, that
is whether or not women responded to the dowry question and whether or not they in fact paid a
dowry.
5.2. Endogeneity
The possible determinants of dowries, discussed in Section 4, are not necessarily exogenous. More
speci¯cally, the education and work activity of brides are such variables. Parents of girls plausibly
must decide, when their daughters are young, whether to invest more in their daughter's education,
16or save for her dowry. These variables are then simultaneously determined, although the investment
in education occurs prior to the transfer of dowry. The labour input of women could either be
predetermined before marriage according to characteristics of the groom's household, or be the
result of negotiations during the marriage bargain. That is, bridal parents bargain to lower their
daughter's labour input by o®ering a high dowry payment. Or alternatively a large dowry may
confer higher status upon a bride within the household of her in-laws and as a result she is required
to work less. Hence a bride's labour input is probably endogenous to dowry determination.
To address these problems of endogeneity, regressions in which the education of brides and their
labour input are the dependent variables are run prior to the dowry estimations. Additionally, it is
also the case that the labour input of brides is in turn related to their education and because we are
considering a marriage market, the direction of causality is again not straightforward. On the one
hand, a highly educated bride may be able to bargain for fewer labour hours within the household.
On the other hand, it may also be the case that the labour input of brides is predetermined
according to household characteristics, and households with a low female labour demand attract
highly educated brides. To this end, an equation for brides' education, E, is ¯rst estimated and
in turn the predicted values from this regression enter into the estimation of the labour activity of
brides. The education of brides is represented by the following:
E = ¯EXE + "E (5.4)
The vector XE contains the literacy rate of the bride's area of origin and personal characteristics of
her parents; in particular their income and her mother's education since (as seen from the correlation
results) a mother's education has a greater in°uence on her daughter's education relative to her
son's.
The literacy rate for the woman's area of origin is used to identify the education e®ect in other
equations. Presumably, parents are more likely to educate their daughters in an area where female
literacy is high. Since 44% of brides have migrated, for almost half of the observations this literacy
rate is distinct from the one in the areas where the couple resides. The average literacy rate
is computed using the regional variation in the larger LSMS sample. This produces 50 di®erent
literacy rates to correspond to the birth place of brides. Of the brides who did migrate, 4% are
from areas in Pakistan which were not included in the larger sample, the literacy rate for this region
17was predicted from the 1981 Pakistan Census using rates for 1981 and 1991 from other districts in
the vicinity.16
The number of children that a bride has and the total number of female household members
are used to identify the e®ect of bride's labour input. Incidentally, neither of these variables are
strongly correlated with household income (0.02 and 0.16 respectively). The total hours worked by
brides, H, are represented by the following equation:
H = ¯HXH + ¯HE b E + "H (5.5)
where b E is the predicted value from the estimation of equation (5.4). The vector XH includes the
female labour force participation rate, type of household, number of female household members,
number of children, and household income. Since a bride's total labour value includes caring for
the children, we would expect that her total labour hours are positively related to the number of
children she has. If a family uses female labour in household production, it is likely that the demand
for individual female labour is lower, the greater the total number of females in the household.
As discussed earlier, there is an additional status component to female labour, that is, women
who work for income are considered lower status. To address this issue, a probit estimation of the
probability that a bride works in an income-generating activity is also evaluated and depicted as
follows:
W = ¯WXW +¯WE b E + "W (5.6)
where W is an index function such that W > 0 if a bride does work in an income-generating
activity and W ￿ 0 otherwise. The vector XW contains the female labour force participation rate,
type of household, number of female household members, and household income. The number of
children is left out of the above estimation since it is easily argued that this variable is endogenous
to whether or not women work outside of the home.
An alternative approach to estimating H and W is to separate the hours worked inside the home
from those contributing to an income-generating activity. However, the restriction of summing the
two types of hours together in a regression on the value of dowry is accepted using an F-test and
the predicted probability that a bride contributes directly to household income is included into the
16Ideally data from 1981 would better correspond to the literacy rate when brides in 1991 were of school age.
However, given present limitations, estimations using such data is infeasible.
18estimations instead.17
As a result of the above discussion, the main estimating equations of (5.1) and (5.2) are better
represented by:
P = °0XP + °1 b E + °2 b H + °3c W + °4¸R + "P (5.7)
and
D = ®0XD +®1 b E +®2 b H + ®3c W + ®4¸R + ®5¸P + "D (5.8)
where ¸R and ¸P are the inverse Mills' ratios from the estimations of equations (5.3) and (5.1)
respectively and b E, b H, and c W are the predicted values from the estimations of (5.4), (5.5), and
(5.6) respectively.18
6. Data
The household level data used in this study are from the Living Standards Measurement Study
(LSMS) of Pakistan, collected in 1991 under the direction of the World Bank and the Government of
Pakistan. The sample is divided equally between Pakistan's urban and rural areas, with provincial
shares approximating population shares. The data contain detailed information on the education,
income, and all labour activity of individuals. Approximately 4700 households were surveyed,
however information on dowries was requested only from females who had married in the past ¯ve
years. This leaves a female sample eligible for the dowry question of roughly 1300. Approximately
800 of those females responded to the dowry question and of those, roughly 700 received a dowry
from their parents, and reported the value and contents of the transfer.
The distribution of the dowry sample across provinces and between rural and urban areas
very closely matches that of the entire LSMS sample (discrepancies of at most 7%). For all the
estimations, rural and urban areas are analysed independently to allow for the fact that the dowry
phenomenon may exist in these distinct areas for di®erent reasons. The survey de¯nes urban areas
as all settlements with a population of 5000 or more in 1981. The means and standard deviations
of the variables used in the analysis of the dowry sample, (those women who responded to the
dowry question,) are listed in Table 1 below. There are 25 observations which were excluded
17The F-statistic approximates zero and hence the restriction is accepted at all levels of signi¯cance.
18It will be seen in the estimations that the two sample selection rules (5.3) and (5.1) are in fact independent,
i.e., ¸R is insigni¯cant in the estimation of (5.7). As a result, ¸R and ¸P can enter into the estimation of (5.8)
independently, where ¸P is the inverse Mill's ratio from the estimation of (5.7) without ¸R as a regressor.
19from the sample. Eleven of these are considered outliers and the remaining fourteen eliminated
observations are brides who came from outside of Pakistan to marry.19 These marriages could have
been arranged by families to re-establish lost connections or for another reason. In any case, the
implications of these arrangements on marriage payments is unknown and likely not to be a random
selection process.
Urban Rural
Variable Mean S. D. Mean S. D.
Bride paid a dowry 0.88 0.33 0.86 0.34
Value of dowry 31956 38968 21476 59568
Bride literate 0.41 0.49 0.14 0.34
Bride's education level 3.53 4.61 1.03 2.50
Bride works in income-generating activity 0.11 0.32 0.42 0.49
Bride's earnings 445 535 247 244
Bride's total hours of work 39.8 28.1 46.7 34.9
Groom literate 0.69 0.46 0.49 0.50
Groom's education level 6.27 5.13 3.93 4.33
Groom works on family farm 0.01 0.12 0.34 0.47
Grooms works in family enterprise 0.36 0.48 0.13 0.34
Groom works in agriculture 0.003 0.05 0.03 0.17
Grooms works in non-agriculture 0.52 0.50 0.41 0.49
Groom's earnings 2109 2045 1373 718
Groom's total hours of work 45.3 26.4 40.0 24.7
Bride's parents income (predicted) 74403 33460 60464 26191
Household income 76345 92921 56427 158193
Table 1 - Summary statistics of dowry sample
The average hours per week reported in the table are conditional on individuals working.20
Monthly individual income of the bride and groom are only their earnings from wage labour,
and the reported values are conditional on their working outside the home.21 Annual household
incomes, on the other hand, do include revenue from a family farm or enterprise in addition to
19Of the outliers: one reported a dowry equal to approximately 80 times the mean, and 22 standard deviations
above the mean; others listed hours of work per week greater than 168; one had a household income equal to roughly
150 times the mean and 25 standard deviations above the mean; and three others had a household income equal to
zero. The majority of brides which were dropped migrated from India; a few others from Bangladesh, Afghanistan,
and elsewhere.
20Total hours worked is the sum of hours per week in each activity including household work for females. Bride's
household activities include: fetching water; gathering ¯rewood; animal care/grazing/herding; preparing dung cakes;
milking animals/making ghee; taking meals to ¯eld workers; going to the market; grinding °our or musking rice;
cooking/baking/washing dishes; cleaning the house/laundry/ironing; stitching/embroidery for household use; child
care and teaching.
21Earnings from work outside of the home include cash and in kind payments. All income variables are in 1991
rupees. There are approximately 25 rupees to the dollar.
20total wage income from all family members. Because it is always the case that brides join the
household of the groom upon marriage, the income of the bride's parents is not available in the
data as only the groom's household, where the bride lives, is surveyed. However information on
each woman's parents' education, occupation, and geographical location is known. I subsequently
estimated the household income for all households in the entire sample of the data (3000 households
once eliminating those with household heads and their spouses of an unreasonably young age to be
parents of an adult child) using education, occupation, and geographical location of the household
head and his spouse as the determinants of income. Coe±cients from this estimation were used to
form the predicted values of a bride's parents' annual income.
Almost all individuals, 95%, in the sample are Muslim. The majority of families live in extended
households, only 13% form nuclear households. This greatly contrasts with the total LSMS sample,
where over half of the households are nuclear. This is expected, however, given the selecting criteria
of the dowry sample which requests information only from women who married in the past ¯ve
years. The probability that this event occurred is substantially higher in extended households
where, by de¯nition, the number of potential adult couples surpasses the single adult couple in
nuclear households. Household type is controlled for in the estimations.
A very large proportion of the sample, 87%, paid a dowry. Dowry payments are always positive
(there was no question asked about transfers from the groom's side, i.e., dowers or bride-prices),
and the variation in the payments is substantial, (the standard deviation is roughly double the
mean). The table below lists the averages and percentiles of absolute dowry payments and as a




Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban
Average 26806 21476 31939 1.65 2.05 1.27
25th percentile 6000 5000 10000 0.16 0.17 0.15
50th percentile 14500 10350 18000 0.37 0.39 0.35
75th percentile 31000 22000 40000 0.85 0.96 0.77
Table 2 - Summary statistics of dowry payments
In general, average dowry payments are signi¯cantly higher than median dowry payments, thus
re°ecting that only a small proportion of families give very large dowries. Dowry payments are
22The value of dowry if in 1991 rupees. The contents include: agriculture land, jewelry and currency, household
e®ects, and other goods and property.
21higher in urban areas; however as a proportion of grooms' household income they are greater in
rural areas.
Household income in the sample is higher in urban areas than in rural, where median incomes
are approximately half that of urban incomes. Similarly, the average income of grooms is roughly
twice as high in urban areas than in rural areas. On average, 27% of brides work in an income
generating activity where they generally engage in household production and only 6% work outside
the home. This participation rate for women is signi¯cantly higher in rural areas, than in urban
areas. Women are more likely to work on family farms than in businesses. If we consider correlations
between the respective characteristics of brides and grooms, we see that, as would be anticipated,
the education and age of marriage of brides and grooms is strongly correlated with the education
and income of their respective parents. It appears that the education of mothers has a greater
in°uence on that of their daughters than sons (a correlation value of 0.50 for daughters and 0.34
for sons). Highly educated brides are more likely to stay at home (as opposed to engaging in an
income generating activity), although if they do work, it is usually in the non-agricultural sector.
For the most part, brides who have wealthy parents do not work at all, aside from work within the
home. Well educated grooms have higher earnings and are engaged in the non-agricultural sector.
To uncover patterns of matching, the following table lists correlations between characteristics
of grooms and brides
Groom
Bride Educ. Earnings Farm Entp. Agric. Non-Ag. Parents' Inc. Age. marr.
Education 0.52 0.17 -0.16 0.18 -0.08 -0.04 0.13 0.24
Earnings -0.00 -0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05 -0.06 -0.00 -0.03
Family Farm -0.22 -0.10 0.36 -0.12 0.02 -0.06 -0.12 -0.13
Enterprise -0.06 -0.00 -0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.00
Agriculture -0.11 -0.07 0.08 -0.02 0.20 -0.10 -0.08 -0.15
Non-Agric. -0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.06 -0.07 0.01 -0.00
Home 0.21 0.12 -0.30 0.09 -0.11 0.09 0.07 0.15
Parents' income 0.42 0.17 -0.21 0.15 -0.04 0.01 0.13 0.16
Age. marr. 0.23 0.08 -0.05 0.05 -0.04 -0.00 0.04 0.43
Table 3 - Traits and work activities of spouses
There is positive assortative matching (individuals of similar traits marry) with respect to age
at marriage and education of spouses. The high correlation value on education could cause concern
22in the estimations where both bride and groom education are included. However, as described
in Section 5.2, brides' education is instrumented for in the estimations. A bride who does not
work for income is typically married to a wealthy, highly educated groom who does not work
in the agricultural sector. Additionally, the income of brides is negatively related to all positive
traits of grooms thus con¯rming that women who work outside the home only do so because the
household faces severe ¯nancial di±culties. Related correlations yield that a bride who works
in family production or outside of the home is likely to be married to a groom who works in
family production or agriculture. Although brides residing in wealthy households typically do not
participate in an income-generating activity, they do, however, work within the home and these
labour hours are only slightly negatively related (a correlation equal to -0.11) to the income of the
household.
There are substantial di®erences between the rural and urban areas in terms of economic devel-
opment and male and female inequality. These di®erences are listed in Table 4 below. The variables
are computed by taking averages across geographic regions from the entire LSMS sample (36,000
individuals). This procedure produces 303 possible values corresponding to the di®erent sampling
locations (151 rural areas and 152 urban areas). The economic variables relevant to the conjectures
of Section 3, include relative male and female hourly wages (where average wages are equal to zero
if no individuals earn a wage in the area and relative wages are equal to the female wage subtracted
from the male wage) and the relative heterogeneity in quality between grooms and brides. To re°ect
quality, I calculate the relative heterogeneity in both years of education and weekly earnings. To
capture the degree of relative heterogeneity, I compute the respective standard deviations of the
distributions across men and women and then subtract the female standard deviation from that of
the males.23 In the survey, men and women were both asked how many daughters and sons they
would like to have if they could start their families over again. The relative preference for daughters
compared to sons for women and men are listed. A value of less than one re°ects a gender bias
in favour of sons. Using population numbers, a `marriage squeeze' variable is constructed which is
equal to the ratio of females of marrying age (15 to 20) to males of marrying age (20 to 25); a value
greater than one re°ects an excess supply of brides.
23The sample of men and women are of comparable ages to those in the dowry sample; between 20 and 40 for men
and between 15 and 35 for women.
23Urban Rural
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Relative agric. wage 0.0144 0.159 -0.0944 0.659
Relative non-agric wage 7.192 8.092 5.668 5.959
Male formal LFP 0.268 0.101 0.235 0.095
Female formal LFP 0.044 0.046 0.0964 0.125
Relative educ. heterogeneity 0.615 1.306 2.055 1.59
Stan. dev. male education 4.53 0.9 4.0 1.12
Stan. dev. female education 3.92 1.4 1.96 1.59
Avg. male education 6.44 2.60 4.05 2.11
Avg. female education 4.10 2.83 1.17 1.33
Relative earnings heterogeneity 253.53 296.66 158.35 91.78
Stan. dev. male earnings 311.25 324 179.4 85.3
Stan. dev. female earnings 57.72 68 21.1 28.8
Avg. male earnings 246.28 214.25 152.88 93.55
Avg. female earnings 19.96 27.38 9.68 16.26
Male preference for daughters 0.938 0.501 0.81 0.14
Female preference for daughters 0.922 0.148 0.97 0.34
Marriage squeeze 1.303 0.736 1.33 0.58
Table 4 - Economic and gender inequality indicators
In general, men earn more than women, as seen by the positive relative wages. The negative
value for relative rural agricultural wages is due to the relatively high participation rate for women
in that sector (8% of rural women work in agriculture and 4% of rural men do, where the very
low participation rates for both genders are due to the fact that most individuals do not engage
in wage labour instead they work on the household farm). The relative heterogeneity of male
and female education is higher in rural areas, re°ecting more equality in education between men
and women in urban areas. The opposite holds true for earnings, where there is much greater
inequality between men and women in urban areas. If we consider the standard deviations alone,
we see that the means of those in the urban areas are almost double those in rural areas with
the exception of male education where the mean is almost equal across the areas. These results
correspond to the supposition that heterogeneity is an outcome of development where the degree of
heterogeneity is substantially higher in urban areas. Additionally if we assume that opportunities
for education typically predate employment opportunities, then we might suspect that the di®erence
in heterogeneity between urban and rural areas is much larger for income than for education, as is
the case for male education. In general, there is a preference for sons over daughters. Men's bias
for sons is noticeably smaller compared to women's in rural areas. There appears to be an excess
24supply of potential brides (approximately 30%) and the number does not vary substantially across
rural and urban areas.
7. Results
7.1. Responded to Dowry Question
The results of a probit estimation of (5.3), the probability that an eligible female answered the
dowry question, are listed in Table 5 below. The LSMS surveys are administered such that female
interviewers conduct the interviews with female members of the household. Thus, information
about the status of women and the various activities they undertake is obtained directly from the
women themselves rather than from the male members of the household. Given that the response
rate of the general female questionnaire is almost perfect, it is probably not the case that women
did not respond to the dowry question because of their status within the household, which means
that variables which re°ect the status of women relative to their husbands should not in°uence
brides' decision to respond to the dowry question. Individual traits of the eligible females may
alter the response rate since it is conceivable, for example, that less educated women were less
likely to understand the eligibility criteria. Ethnic dummy variables (Punjabis, Baloch, Sindhis,
Muhajirs) enter into the estimation to proxy for a social custom that may prohibit women from
answering the dowry question for fear of embarrassment, or alternatively because confusion with
respect to the eligibility criteria was more severe in particular regions.
25Variable Coe±cient S.E. @F
@X t-statistic
Rural -0.03 0.13 -0.01 -0.24
Sindhis/Muhajirs -0.55 0.13 -0.21 -4.21
Punjabis -0.003 0.12 -0.001 -0.03
Baloch -0.46 0.17 -0.18 -2.66
Household income 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.61
Bride literate 0.11 0.18 0.04 0.62
Bride's education level -0.005 0.02 -0.002 -0.22
Bride works in family production -0.19 0.10 -0.07 -1.88
Bride works outside the home -0.28 0.16 -0.11 -1.69
Bride migrated for marriage 0.17 0.09 0.07 1.82
Bride from rural area -0.10 0.13 -0.04 -0.75
Family is nuclear 0.14 0.09 0.05 1.54
Groom's education level 0.013 0.01 0.005 1.35
Groom works in agriculture 0.26 0.22 0.10 1.17
Groom works in non-agriculture 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.56
Groom works in family business 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.93
Groom's income 0.000 0.00 0.00 1.07
Married for one year -0.28 0.16 -0.11 -1.76
Married for two years -0.30 0.16 -0.12 -1.93
Married for three years -0.36 0.16 -0.14 -2.27
Married for four years -0.59 0.15 -0.23 -3.82
Married for ¯ve years -1.11 0.16 -0.42 -6.87





Table 5 - Probit estimation of probability of answering dowry question
The results show that individual characteristics of both grooms and brides are insigni¯cant
determinants of the response rate. The ethnicity dummies do alter the response rate signi¯cantly.
From the results, it is clear that years of marriage is a most important determinant of whether or
not a woman responded. The dummy variables representing the number of years married before
the survey year (1991) are negatively related to whether a female responded, that is, those females
married earlier (i.e., for more years) were less likely to respond to the dowry question, hence
providing support for the conjecture that the lack of response was caused by confusion over the
eligibility criteria.
267.2. Bride's Education
The results from the estimation of a bride's education, equation (5.4), are reported in Table 6 below.
Aside from the literacy rate of the bride's area of origin, personal characteristics of her parents also
enter, in particular their income and her mother's education since (as seen from the correlation
results) a mother's education has a greater in°uence on her daughter's education relative to her
son's.
Variable Coe±cient S.E. t-statistic
Bride's parents' income 0.00003 0.00001 1.950
Bride's mother is literate 3.74 0.53 7.065
Female literacy rate 10.26 1.66 6.163
Bride from rural area 0.35 0.43 0.822
[Bride's parents' income]2 0.00 0.00 0.055





Table 6 - OLS estimation of bride's education
As would be expected, the main determinants of a woman's education are her parents income,
her mother's education, and the female literacy rate. Being from a rural area is an insigni¯cant
determinant, once controlling for female literacy in the region. Higher order terms of bride's parents'
income enter negatively and insigni¯cantly. If the predicted values of bride's education (for varying
levels of parental wealth) are plotted against parental income, we see that the relationship is linear.
Therefore at higher levels of wealth, it seems that parents continue to invest in their daughter's
education.
7.3. Bride's Labour Input
There is an important distinction between women working in an income-generating activity and
those who only work within the home. Perhaps the critical di®erence is manifested in the social
status associated with the two activities. On the other hand, in poorer families, women who also
contribute to the household income in the case of necessity could be highly valued in marriage
negotiations. In the analysis, the hours of work in these two types of activities are not separated,
instead, to isolate the status component of female labour, the probability that a bride contributes
directly to household income is considered.
27The results from a probit estimation of the probability that a bride works in an income-
generating activity, equation (5.6), are listed in Table 7 below. The estimation includes the female
labour force participation rate, i.e., the proportion of women who earn a wage outside the home,
in the area where the bride resides. This variable is computed using the regional variation of the
entire LSMS sample (36,000 individuals) which produces 300 possible values corresponding to the
di®erent sampling locations.
Variable Coe±cient S.E. @F
@X t-statistic
Bride's education (predicted) -.1136 .0409 -.0295 -2.779
Household Income -3.14e-06 1.21e-06 -8.17e-07 -2.603
Number of female members -.127 .0417 -.0331 -3.050
Family farm 1.271 .1485 .344 8.555
Family business .3571 .1346 .0951 2.654
Female labour force participation rate 1.553 .5888 .404 2.637
Rural .244 .1598 .0636 1.526
Constant -.9739 .1977 -4.927
Observations 678
Pseudo R2 .28
Table 7 - Probit estimation of bride working in income-generating activity24
This labour force participation rate turns out to be a signi¯cant and positive determinant of
whether or not a bride works in an income-generating activity. As would be anticipated, when
the family has household production, either a family farm or business, a bride is signi¯cantly more
likely to contribute labour to the enterprise. The number of female household members, household
income, and the education of the bride all have negative coe±cients and enter the estimation
signi¯cantly. Residing in a rural area is positively related to the probability that a bride contributes
to family income but is insigni¯cant.
A tobit estimation of brides total weekly hours of labour, equation (5.5), includes the same
independent variables.25 The results are reported below:
24The potential endogeneity of bride's education is dealt with using a two-stage estimation approach. The reported
R
2
from the instrumenting equation is 0.36.
25The tobit model estimated is a Type 1 tobit according to Amemiya (1985) taxonomy. It is estimated using the
TOBIT command in STATA.
28Variable Coe±cient S.E. t-statistic
Bride's education (predicted) 0.65 0.58 1.12
Household Income -0.000024 0.00001 -2.26
Number of children 3.56 0.85 4.19
Number of female members -5.48 0.77 -7.10
Family farm 5.96 3.03 1.97
Family business 1.67 2.63 0.64
Female labour force participation rate -3.85 13.43 -0.29
Rural 5.74 3.26 1.76
Constant 51.1 3.79 13.48
Observations 649
Pseudo R2 0.02
Table 8 - Tobit estimation of bride's work hours
We see that the determinants of brides total labour are di®erent from those which in°uence her
decision to work in an income-generating activity however. In particular, the number of children
a woman has is signi¯cantly and positively related to her labour hours. The other important
determinants are household income and the number of female members which, similar to above,
are negatively related to the bride's labour input. Additionally, brides work more hours if the
family has a farm. The remaining variables enter into the estimation insigni¯cantly. It may be
worth noting, however, that when the two types of labour hours are separated, the coe±cients of
a bride's education and the labour force participation rate have opposite signs in the independent
estimations. That is, brides' education is related signi¯cantly and positively to their household
labour and the labour force participation rate enters negatively and signi¯cantly. In an estimation
of brides' labour hours into an income generating activity, the opposite relationships ensue.
Recall from the previous section that the predicted values from the above probit and tobit
estimations, represented by c W and b H respectively, will enter into the estimations of the probability
of whether a bride receives a dowry, equation (5.7), and the value of dowry, equation (5.8). The
predicted labour hours from the tobit estimation which are negative were assigned to zero for the
estimations.
7.4. Dowry Paid
The results from a weighted least squares estimation of the probability of a bride paying a dowry,
equation (5.7), are listed in Table 9 below. In each case an unweighted linear probability model
was initially estimated, from which the predicted values of the dependent variable were used to
29compute the weights for the subsequent regression.26 The inverse Mills' ratio from estimation of
the ¯rst selection rule, of whether or not a bride responded to the dowry question, is included in
the estimation.
The variables which pertain directly to Conjectures 1 to 3 are relative wages, relative hetero-
geneity, and average income. Dowry as a compensation payment (Conjecture 1) is prominent when
there is homogeneity (i.e., negatively related to heterogeneity), relative wages are high, and aver-
age income is low. Dowry as an inheritance (Conjecture 2) is more likely when there is equality
between brides and grooms (i.e., negatively related to heterogeneity), relative wages are low, and
the population is wealthy. Dowry as a groomprice (Conjecture 3) is more likely when heterogeneity
is large, relative wages are high, and the population is wealth.
Variables which re°ect the quality of grooms and brides and their respective households are
also included to test for the possibility that dowry payments are transferred only amongst families
highly positioned in society. It can be argued that the wealth of the groom family is an endoge-
nous determinant of the value of dowry (where from Table 2 we see that dowry forms a signi¯cant
proportion of household annual income). To this end, total food expenditure enters into the estima-
tions to proxy for the wealth level of the groom's household. It is worth noting that the results are
unchanged if household income enters in instead. Since dowries may occur only in households with
particular work patterns between the men and women, the labour activities of brides and grooms
are considered. Variables which may a®ect marriage customs, and therefore dowries, also enter the
estimation; these include whether or not the couple form a nuclear family, if the bride migrated
for marriage, and the relative preference for daughters of both men and women. Ethnic dummy
variables enter into the estimation to proxy for variation in social custom which may or may not
allow for dowry to be transferred. The included categories are the Punjabis (56% of the sample),
Pakhtuns (15% of the sample), and Baloch (7% of the sample).27 The Punjabis form a strati¯ed
society where they are typically divided into qaums. These qaums are based on occupational spe-
26The weights used are given by wi = [b yi(1¡b yi)]
1
2, where b yi is the predicted dependent variable from an unweighted
estimation of the linear probability model. For some observations the predicted probability exceeded one (by at most
0.2) and in these cases the predicted value was assigned to 0.99 for the estimation. This procedure decreased the
average predicted probability by at most 0.009. There does not appear to be a single predictor which is causing these
very high probabilities. Since the average probability of paying a dowry is very high, at 87%, there is substantial
scope for higher values of the education and income levels to perfectly predict the occurrence of dowries.
27See Blood (1995) and Wilber (1964) for descriptions of these di®erent ethnic groups which are primarily concen-
trated in their home provinces. See also Klein and Nestvogel (1992) for an analysis of women in Pakistan.
30cialization which gives each group its name and position in the social hierarchy. The Pakhtuns
form one of the largest tribal groups in the world. They are organized into clans with an intense
egalitarian ethos. Central to their identity is the adherence to a male centered code of conduct.
The Baloch are also a tribal population who are typically pastoral nomadic. In contrast to the
other societies, lineages play a minimal role and marriage patterns embody substantial °exibility.
The left out category forms an ethnically diverse group which is typically educated and resides in
the province of Sindh. Additionally, the demographic variable, known as the marriage squeeze,
enters into the estimation and represents the ratio of potential brides to grooms.
Urban Rural
Variable Coe±cient S.E. Coe±cient S.E.
Groom's parents' food expenses 6.72e-05 3.68e-05 3.36e-06 2.19e-05
(Groom's parents' food expenses)2 -6.54e-09 3.41e-09 2.32e-11 3.63e-10
Bride's parents' income -4.12e-06 2.49e-06 -1.07e-07 3.28e-06
(Bride's parents' income)2 1.57e-11 1.18e-11 -1.90e-12 2.23e-11
Groom's education .0093 .0047 .0106 .00585
Groom's earnings -7.35e-06 1.48e-05 -3.17e-05 3.44e-05
Groom works on family farm -.0287 .161 -.0341 .0631
Groom works in family enterprise .00206 .051 -.0583 .0771
Bride's education -.00191 .015 .00915 .0387
Bride's total hours of work .00156 .0027 .00106 .00324
Bride works for income -.244 .177 -.0650 .1513
Pay heterogeneity -.0205 .018 -.0409 .0152
Educ. heterogeneity -.000115 7.27e-05 -.00037* .00026
Average income 8.73e-07 6.21e-07 -2.15e-07 5.21e-07
Relative non-agric wages -.00113 .0027 .00113 .00431
Relative agric wages .0595 .0614
Baloch -.315* .0781 -.361* .125
Pakhtuns -.0506 .0836 -.00642 .117
Punjabis .0215 .0588 -.0591 .0836
Male preference for daughters .108* .0498 .530* .199
Female preference for daughters .0557 .1789 -.0520 .0590
Bride migrated for marriage .0319 .046 .1222* .0488
Marriage squeeze -.0181 .0277 -.0317 .0416
Nuclear family .0582 .0692 -.0647 .0734
Inverse Mill's ratio -.230 .385 .389 .3034





31Table 9 - Linear probability estimation of the probability of giving a dowry28
The inverse Mill's ratio from the regression of the response rate to the dowry question is insignif-
icant. In other words, the probability of answering the dowry question is unlikely to be correlated
with the probability of paying a dowry.29
We see that very few of the variables relevant to Conjectures 1 to 3 are signi¯cant determinants of
the probability of giving a dowry. Relative heterogeneity in earnings is an insigni¯cant determinant,
whereas that of education is signi¯cant and negatively related to paying a dowry in rural areas. In
other words, the more equal is the degree of heterogeneity in education across brides and grooms,
the more likely a dowry is paid. This result is in accordance with the inheritance role for dowry, as
described in Conjecture 2, however, none of the other predictions of that conjecture are supported.
In general, economic variables do not seem to explain much of the variation in the prominence of
dowries. It is the case that a very high percentage (approximately 87%) of the sample paid a dowry
and hence there is not much variation to explain. However, on the other hand, as we will now see,
social customs do seem to play a strong role in explaining the prominence of dowry payments in
both rural and urban areas.
Ethnic variation is an important determinant of whether or not a dowry was paid at marriage
or not. Being of Baloch ethnicity signi¯cantly lowers the probability that a dowry is given. As
already noted, these are typically nomadic tribal people, and perhaps even more importantly their
marriage and kinship patterns are relatively °exible. Ideally, a man should maintain close ties with
relatives in his father's line, but in practice most relations are left to the discretion of the individual
and it is quite typical for lineages to split and fragment.30 It is interesting to note, that this result
echos conclusions elsewhere in the literature on marriage payments, where typically the custom
of dowry is found in strati¯ed societies where maintaining class and ethnic alliances with one's
in-laws is of utmost importance.31 Usually bride-price is found in societies which are relatively
28An asterix following the coe±cient denotes signi¯cance of the variable the 5% level. The weighted least squares
method for the linear probability model of paying a dowry was used. Bride's education, the probability that a bride
works for income, and brides' total work hours are assumed endogenous. The method of two-stage least squares is
used to deal with this problem. The R
2
of the instrumenting equations are 0.36, 0.28, and 0.02 respectively.
29It should be noted that the signi¯cant determinants of the probability that a dowry is paid all remain signi¯cant
when the inverse Mill's ratio is omitted from the estimation. The coe±cients on the signi¯cant variables are altered
by, on average, one half of a standard error, (no parameter estimates changed by more than 0.8 of a standard error),
when the inverse Mill's ratio is included in the estimation.
30See, Blood (1995).
31See Goody (1976), Harrell and Dickey (1985), Gaulin and Boster (1990), and Jackson and Romney (1973) for
32homogeneous, egalitarian, and tribal.32 This data does not contain information on bride-prices but
the low occurrence of the dowry custom amongst the Baloch may be consistent with such a custom.
Curiously, of all the variables which vary by geographical location, only the preference for
daughters by men is a signi¯cant determinant of whether or not brides receive a dowry. This
variable enters into the estimation positively. This relationship is independent of the income e®ect,
where generally it is believed that there is less of a male bias in higher income areas since the
average income in the area is also included in the regression. Additionally, the relative population
of females is controlled for by the marriage squeeze variable.
Brides who migrated for marriage are signi¯cantly more likely to receive a dowry in rural areas.
From the total number of brides who migrated, 92% did so for the purposes of marriage. Of those
who migrated for this reason, 44% went from rural areas into rural areas, 28% from rural areas into
urban areas, 23% from urban areas into urban areas, and the remaining 4% moved from urban areas
into rural areas. When these di®erent possibilities enter into the estimation separately, the only
one that is signi¯cant is brides migrating from one rural area into another. This tentatively rules
out the importance of brides moving to wealthier regions, i.e., urban areas, to marry into families
of superior status.33 One explanation for this result perhaps lies in the traditional custom of cross-
cousin marriage in Pakistan, where kinship groups are likely to reside within close proximity. There
is evidence that this custom is on the decline; however, in some localities it remains an in°uence in
the marriage selection process, especially in rural areas.34 Dowry payments have a particular role
in the reciprocity relationships embedded in this traditional institution and hence are more likely
to occur where the custom is practiced.35
That a bride joins a nuclear family is an insigni¯cant determinant of whether or not she pays
the association between dowry and wealth di®erentiation.
32See Goody and Tambiah (1973) for a discussion of brideprice.
33It is quite plausible that whether or not a bride migrated for marriage is an endogenous determinant of the
probability that a dowry was paid and of the value of that payment. This may well be the case if we think that
women who can a®ord a high dowry are able to consider a larger pool of potential grooms, than just the ones at
home, to ¯nd her match. Given this, we would expect to ¯nd that women migrate to the city only if they can a®ord
a husband there and hence the existence of dowry payments should be associated with women who migrate from
rural to urban areas. Additionally, it should be the case that higher dowry payments are positively associated with
the probability that a woman migrates for marriage. However, neither of these relationships is found in the data (see
tables 14 and 15 in the Appendix for the result for the value of dowries). Therefore, I will not consider this variable
to be endogenous in the estimations of the paper.
34See, for example, Korson (1971), Pastner (1979) and (1981), Donnan (1988), Wahab and Ahmad (1996), and
Shami et. al. (1994).
35See, for example, de Munck (1990), Donnan (1988), and Eglar (1960).
33a dowry. Nonetheless, given that the selection procedure over samples extended households, this
may be a more important determinant than the estimation results reveal. The main concern is
that dowry may function di®erently within nuclear households compared to extended households,
particularly because the formation of the former is usually considered a sign of modernisation, or
the transformation into a more modern family structure. However, performing a Chow test using
the divided sample between nuclear and extended households in the estimation of the value of
dowry, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the two regressions are the same.36
7.5. Value of Dowry
The results from the regressions on the value of dowry, equation (5.8), are listed in Tables 10 and
11 below for urban and rural samples respectively. The central components of the estimations are
characteristics which pertain to the determinants of dowries in Conjectures 4 to 6. These include
the quality of the bride and groom which is represented by their education, income, and labour
activity. Since individual earnings are only reported for those individuals who work for a wage,
dummy variables which are equal to one if the groom works primarily in his household farm or
business are also included in the estimations. Conjectures 4 to 6 also place predictions on the
wealth level of the brides' and grooms' parents, the average wealth level of all other competing
parents (represented by average household income), and relative groom and bride heterogeneity in
quality. Not only are the individual traits potentially important in absolute terms, but it is also
possible that their relative status a®ects dowry payments. In particular, dowry payments increase
in the relative quality between the groom and bride in Conjecture 4, whereas dowry payments
change with the absolute values in Conjecture 5 and with the relative quality of grooms and brides
relative to all grooms and brides respectively in Conjecture 6. Because the correlation between the
absolute and relative values of these variables is very high, they enter into separate estimations.
The ¯rst column of results in the two tables below includes the absolute values, the relative quality
between the bride and groom are in the second, and the relative quality of the bride and groom
with respect to all brides and grooms respectively are in the third column.
Of all the general characteristics that were important in determining the probability that a
dowry was paid (Table 9), only ethnicity is also a signi¯cant determinant of the value of dowry.
36The F-statistic is equal to 1.20 and is less than the critical value at all signi¯cance levels.
34To this end, the other general characteristics are not included in the estimation on the value of
dowry, and, in particular, male preference for daughters and whether or not a bride migrated for
marriage are used to instrument for the probability that a dowry was paid in the ¯rst stage of
the estimation. See Table 13 in the Appendix for an estimation on the value of dowry when these
general characteristics are included, together with years of marriage, which, as already discussed,
is used to instrument for the estimation of whether or not individuals responded to the dowry
question. Furthermore, for the urban sample below, the inverse Mill's ratios from both sampling
estimations are not included because they are not signi¯cant determinants, as is seen in Table 12
in the Appendix. This is not the case for the rural sample, where the inverse Mill's ratio from the
estimation of the response rate is signi¯cant and therefore included in the estimations of Table 11.
Variable Coe®. S.E. Coe®. S.E. Coe®. S.E.
Household food expenses 12.22* 3.16 13.90* 3.107 14.85* 3.087
(Household food expenses)2 -.0011* .000325 -.0012* .000325 -.0012* .00032
Bride's parents' income -.0287 .1758 .0607 .173 .1018 .172
(Bride's parents' income)2 9.58e-07 7.58e-07 1.10e-06 7.63e-07 1.16e-06 7.52e-07
Groom's education 1459.22* 393.153
(Groom's educ. - avg. educ.) 1119.62* 435.827
Bride's education 997.924 1098.14
(Bride's educ. - avg. educ.) -2868.86* 826.581
(Groom's educ. - Bride's educ.) 1272.605* 383.75
Groom's earnings 5.35* 1.205
(Groom's pay - average pay) 5.70* 1.252
(Groom's pay - Bride's pay) 5.191* 1.196
Groom works for family farm 29602.73 16977.9 30013.26 17138.53 31710.27 16903.55
Groom works for family bus. 10903.16* 4200.2 11817.21* 4186.19 12035.8* 4066.44
Bride's hours of work 139.75 200.38 237.04 198.01 343.84 198.003
Bride works for income -2506.724 15997.13 -10988.02 15747.63 -14668.93 15639.17
Educ. Heterogeneity -1466.43 1521.98 -1810.77 1529.92 233.60 1683.72
Pay Heterogeneity 16.222* 7.0771 15.29* 7.143 13.93* 7.128
Average income .03325 .0442 .0355 .0446 .01126 .0454
Baloch 418.75 8686.89 -4879.40 8412.59 -3428.57 8312.44
Pakhtuns 5387.66 6221.96 1733.81 6026.85 2702.74 5938.18
Punjabis 24641.84* 4073.18 23793.93* 4093.03 23453.85* 4034.06
Constant -40626.11* 13352.28 -43513.38* 13430.51 -49707.29* 13723.9




35Table 10 - OLS estimation of the value of dowry for the urban sample37
All three of the estimations show that grooms' household wealth is an important positive de-
terminant of the value of dowry paid in urban areas. Both lower and higher order terms enter
signi¯cantly, and show that the relationship seems slightly concave. The quality of the groom,
in both absolute and relative terms, is positively and signi¯cantly related to the value of urban
dowries. This result is re°ected in both the earnings and education of grooms. On the other hand,
bridal parent income does not signi¯cantly a®ect the value of dowry. This result, together with
the positive impact of groom quality, rules out the inheritance role for dowry payments, as pre-
scribed by Conjecture 5. The importance of the quality of the groom and his household, together
with the positive signi¯cance of relative heterogeneity in earnings provides strong support for the
groomprice role of dowry payments in urban areas. In fact, the third estimation below almost
perfectly supports Conjecture 6 (groomprice), where additionally brides relative attributes are neg-
atively and signi¯cantly related to the value of dowry. Dowry as a compensation payment is not
necessarily ruled out by the estimations (as the predictions of Conjecture 4 are supported in the
second estimation), however, this role for dowry cannot explain the importance of heterogeneity
and the relative status of grooms and brides with respect to other grooms and brides respectively.
Whereas dowry as a groomprice payment suggests that dowry payments should be increasing in
the relative quality of the groom and bride with respect to each other, as is evident from equation
(4.10). We see that higher dowries occur amongst the Punjabis. This result is also consistent with
the groomprice hypothesis since, as already mentioned, the Punjabis are the most strati¯ed society
of all the groups, and hence relative status and the degree of heterogeneity are more likely to play
a role in the marriage market of such a society. Moreover, this relationship is consistent with other
¯ndings in the literature on marriage payments where increasing dowries are usually associated
with strati¯ed societies where preserving status through marriage is of utmost importance.38
37An asterix following the coe±cient denotes signi¯cance of the variable at the 5% level. Bride's education, the
probability that a bride works for income, and brides' total work hours are assumed endogenous. The method of
two-stage least squares is used to deal with this problem. The R
2
of the instrumenting equations are 0.36, 0.28, and
0.02 respectively.
38See, for example, Hoch (1989) and Gaulin and Boster (1990).
36Variable Coe®. S.E. Coe®. S.E. Coe®. S.E.
Household food expenses 7.028* 2.82 7.88* 2.85 7.82* 2.82*
(Household food expenses)2 -9.59e-05* 4.4e-05 -1.09e-04* 4.4e-05 -1.1e-04* 4.4e-05*
Bride's parents' income -2.62* .382 -2.65* .388 -2.61* .388*
(Bride's parents' income)2 1.66e-05* 2.25e-06 1.93e-05* 2.02e-06 1.93e-05* 2.10e-06*
Groom's education 1301.63 741.27
(Groom's educ. - avg. educ.) 1246.80 822.80
Bride's education 9650.13* 4006.49
(Bride's educ. - avg. educ.) -1967.13 2811.65
(Groom's educ. - Bride's educ.) 873.04 738.03
Groom's earnings -10.86* 4.758
(Groom's pay - average pay) -13.28* 5.13*
(Groom's pay - Bride's pay) -10.035* 4.72
Groom works for family farm 3132.84 8741.67 3711.18 8760.75 2276.70 8760.16
Groom works for family bus. 22258.73* 10839.35 23118.19* 10993.15 21830.24* 10860.05*
Bride's hours of work 336.39 409.21 436.85 413.73 469.83 411.33
Bride works for income -16615.84 19183.37 -24883.75 19289.28 -25582.94 19201.35
Educ. Heterogeneity -1939.32 2022.75 -2078.61 2045.18 -1143.46 2529.83
Pay Heterogeneity 70.65 50.53 52.77 51.15 56.36 52.45
Average income .0832 .102 .0882 .104 .094 .104
Baloch 14296.2 22914.4 10062.59 23160.2 8424.03 23031.97
Pakhtuns 3732.31 11852.15 1977.24 12054.05 1762.48 12015.67
Punjabis 1093.23 11219.36 6597.10 11272.76 5916.88 11237.8
Inverse Mill's Ratio ¸R 135789.7* 49995.28 147368.7* 50554.97 147549.8* 50223.7*
Constant 119548.3* 35603.17 126247.3* 35881.38 125087* 36023.19*




Table 11 - OLS estimation of the value of dowry for the rural sample
In contrast to the urban sample, in addition to the wealth of the groom's household, brides'
parents' income is a signi¯cant determinant of the value of dowry. Both lower and higher order
terms enter signi¯cantly, and show that very high income parents pay high dowries. The degree of
heterogeneity does not signi¯cantly a®ect the value of rural dowries. The results in the ¯rst column
provide direct support for the inheritance role of dowries where, in addition to the e®ects of parental
wealth, groom's earnings enter negatively and bride's education enter positively. The compensation
role of dowry is rejected by the results in the second estimation. Likewise, the negative impact
of groom's relative and absolute earnings (columns one and three), rejects the groomprice role for
rural dowry payments. The Inverse Mill's ratio from the estimation of the response rate of the
dowry question is positively and signi¯cantly related to the value of dowry. This implies, that in
37rural areas, women who received (or paid) higher dowries were more likely to respond to the dowry
question.
8. Conclusion
To my knowledge, this is the ¯rst empirical investigation, of dowry payments in Pakistan. In the
literature on marriage payments, dowry is posited to have several potential roles and the aim of this
paper was to identify which of these roles was relevant to present-day dowry payments in Pakistan.
The results of the empirical analysis support the groom-price explanation in determining the value
of these payments in urban areas, whereas dowries serve the role of a pre-mortem inheritance in
rural areas. Since the traditional custom of dowry in Pakistan is considered an inheritance to
daughters, it appears that this custom still persists in rural areas whereas, like in India, the custom
has evolved into a groomprice payment in urban areas.
On the other hand, the occurrence of dowries appears to be less a result of economic forces,
and more a function of cultural norms. This is suggested by the fact that ethnicity is an important
determinant of the incidence of dowries. Moreover, the probability that brides' parents paid a
dowry is not signi¯cantly related to the status of either brides or grooms or their families. Rather,
traditions rooted in tribal cultures and the practice of cross-cousin marriage may be a more im-
portant in°uence. It appears as though a higher status for women from the perspective of men,
re°ected in their relative preference for daughters, is positively associated with the occurrence of
dowry payments. This would seem to suggest, that from the male perspective, the institution of
dowry is not considered detrimental to either women or themselves.
389. Appendix
Urban Rural
Variable Coe®. S.E. Coe®. S.E.
Household food expenses 8.08* 3.46 7.08* 2.76
(Household food expenses)2 -6.37e-04 3.5e-04 -9.62e-05* 4.34e-05
Bride's parents' income .0254 .208 -2.57* .360
(Bride's parents' income)2 7.91e-07 8.53e-07 1.65e-05* 2.16e-06
Groom's education 1135.93* 462.08 1282 788.43
Bride's education 1111.47 1163.93 9298.48* 3879
Groom's earnings 7.16* 1.64 -10.90* 4.69
Groom works for family farm 32813.77 17829.72 2701.35 8768.82
Groom works for family bus. 13518.2* 4795.96 21624.06* 10700.75
Bride's hours of work 65.0 227.59 308.04 401.96
Bride works for income 7457.04 17984.64 -15690.6 18976.9
Educ. Heterogeneity -1435.13 1675.51 -1955.62 1971.80
Pay Heterogeneity 22.73* 8.02 68.32 49.25
Average income .0268 .048 .094 .10
Inverse Mill's Ratio ¸R 22403.12 30517.6 133920.4* 40487.41
Inverse Mill's Ratio ¸P 76745.09 49495.23 -11610.59 63136.46





Table 12 - OLS Estimation of the value of dowry with Inverse Mill's ratios39
39An asterix following the coe±cient denotes signi¯cance of the variable at the 5% level. Bride's education, the
probability that a bride works for income, and brides' total work hours are assumed endogenous. The method of
two-stage least squares is used to deal with this problem. The R
2
of the instrumenting equations are 0.36, 0.28, and
0.02 respectively.
39Urban Rural
Variable Coe®. S.E. Coe®. S.E.
Household food expenses 9.24* 3.50 6.39* 2.93
(Household food expenses)2 -7.93e-04* 3.5e-04 -8.28e-05 4.56e-05
Bride's parents' income -.130 .186 -2.22* .364
(Bride's parents' income)2 1.32e-06 8.15e-07 1.43e-05* 2.15e-06
Groom's education 1423.90* 434.03 1345.67 742.11
Bride's education 1472.45 1178.89 11790.71* 3868.52
Groom's earnings 7.54* 1.64 -8.44 4.75
Groom works for family farm 33991.44 17996.14 958.07 8911.91
Groom works for family bus. 15388.71* 4757.55 17880.87 10919.53
Bride's hours of work 24.87 242.95 148.65 463.59
Bride works for income 5972.29 16494.53 -9821.65 19874.51
Educ. Heterogeneity -2264.01 1686.0 -2785.0 1961.22
Pay Heterogeneity 17.45* 7.60 94.13 50.32
Average income .044 .047 .1132 .10
Male daughter preference -2220.63 3678.91 16046 24582.35
Female daughter preference -5432.65 11854.6 6211.77 9278.98
Bride migrated for marriage 154.85 3982.57 9356.83 6264.58
Years married 515.14 1272.43 -1687.75 2149.13





Table 13 - OLS Estimation of the value of dowry with sampling instruments
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